This paper tries to overcome these data problems by constructing a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting countries, and employing estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and OECD records. The paper uses these new data to address the key policy question: How pervasive is the brain drain from labor-exporting countries?
Three basic findings emerge from this paper. The first is that with respect to legal migration, international migration involves the movement of the educated. The vast majority of migrants to both the United States and the OECD have a secondary (high school) education or higher. The second finding is that while migrants are well-educated, international migration does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated.
For 22 of the 33 countries in which educational attainment data can be estimated, less than 10 percent of the best educated (tertiary-educated) population of labor-exporting countries has migrated. The third finding is that for a handful of labor-exporting countries, international migration does cause brain drain. For example, for the five Latin American countries (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica and Mexico) located closest to the United States, migration takes a large share of the best educated. This finding suggests that more work needs to be done on the relationship between brain drain, geographical proximity to labor-receiving countries, and the size of the (educated) population of labor-exporting countries.
Within the last decade an increasing amount of attention has focused on the relationship between international migration, brain drain, and economic growth. Since education has often been cited as a major determinant of long-term economic growth, conventional wisdom has typically argued that the international migration of people endowed with a high level of human capital -the so-called "brain drain" -is detrimental for the country of emigration.
1 According to this argument, the large-scale departure of highly-educated workers from developing countries tends to depress income levels and long-run economic growth rates in the developing world.
This conventional view, however, has recently been challenged by the following argument. In a developing economy with a limited growth potential, the return to human capital is likely to be low. This in turn would lead to limited incentive to acquire education, which is seen as the engine of economic growth. However, since the world at large values education, allowing migration of the "best and brightest" from a developing country may actually increase the incentive to acquire education. Since only a small faction of educated people in a specific country would migrate, this would encourage the average level of education of the remaining population to rise.
Deciding which of these arguments is most accurate is difficult, given the paucity of available information on the level and characteristics of international migration. For example, at the international level, there is no consistent or reliable system of data on either the number or skill characteristics of international migrants. Moreover, at the national level, labor-exporting countries do not typically keep track either of the number or the skill characteristics of migrants. And while some labor-receiving countries do keep track these issues, they often use different definitions of immigration. As a result of these data problems, a host of key policy questions remain unanswered. the 20 countries for which data exist, international migration takes less than 10 percent of the population with a tertiary education. Migration to the OECD results in a slightly higher degree of brain drain, but even here international migration takes more than 10 percent of the tertiary-educated population from only 5 of 13 labor-exporting countries.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows. To provide perspective on the growing importance of international migration, Section II presents data on changes in the level of worker remittances received in the 24 countries over the last twenty years.
Section III explains the methodology used for estimating the level of migration to the United States and the OECD. Section IV applies this methodology to estimate the extent of brain drain to the United States by analyzing migration rates and the educational composition of U.S. migrants. Estimates of the level of brain drain to the OECD are presented using similar methods in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. Official Remittances from International Migration
To gain a proper perspective on the importance of international migration, it is best to begin with the most visible product of international migration: remittances received. Not only are remittances critical to the foreign exchange position of many labor-exporting countries, but they are also vital to the consumption and investment behavior of migrant households themselves. Perhaps because of their importance to both labor-exporting countries and households, remittances tend to be the best measured and recorded aspect of the migration experience. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) keeps annual records of the amount of worker remittances received by each labor-exporting country. 7 No other organization -national or international -collects and publishes annual records on any other part of the international migration process.
It should, however, be noted that the IMF only reports data on official worker remittance flows, that is, remittance monies which are transmitted through official banking channels. Since a large (and unknown) proportion of remittance monies is transmitted through informal, unofficial channels, the level of remittances recorded by the IMF underestimates the actual flow of remittance monies returning to labor-exporting countries. For instance, a recent IMF study (El-Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, 2002) estimated that informal transfers of remittance monies could amount to $10 billion per annum.
8 Despite these problems, Table 1 It is interesting to note that that each of the three largest remittance-receivers is sending migrants to a different labor-receiving region. Although data are scanty, India is 7 The IMF records annual flows in international remittances in its publication, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.
8 Focusing on the hawala system of informal transfer, this IMF study of 15 developing countries (2002: 64) estimated that about $35 billion per annum of remittance monies was transmitted through informal channels in the early 1980s, falling to $10 billion per annum in more recent years. The decline in the level of informal transfers was attributed to the disappearance of the black market exchange premiums in many developing countries during the 1990s.
probably sending most of its migrants to the OECD and the Arab Gulf. Because of its proximity to the United States, Mexico is sending most of its migrants to its northern neighbor. Turkey, the third largest remittance-receiver, is sending most of its migrants to the OECD (especially Germany). Table 2 For the 24 study countries as a whole, Table 2 reveals that official worker remittances have increased at a strong 3.86 percent per year in real terms. To put this figure into perspective, Table 3 compares the annual rate of growth in official remittances for the 24 study countries with that of gross domestic product (GDP) for various regions of the developing world. For the twenty-year period, official remittances grew at a faster annual rate than did GDP in 119 low and lower middle-income developing countries (3.86 versus 1.61 percent per year). In two of the six regions of the developing world (Latin America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa), official remittances also grew at a faster annual rate than did GDP.
III. Methodology for Estimating Levels of Migration
Since few, if any, of the major labor-exporting countries keep accurate records on either the number or the educational characteristics of migrants, it is necessary to estimate these variables by using data collected by the main labor-receiving countries. For the purposes of this paper, the main labor-receiving countries (regions) include two: United
States and the OECD. The third large labor-receiving region -the Arab Gulf -does not publish any data on the number or characteristics of migrants, and thus will not be included in this study.
IIIa. Estimating Migration to the United States
Following the pioneering methodology of Carrington and Detragiache (1998), 9 this study employs four steps to estimate migration rates and the educational attainment of migrants to the United States.
The first step is to use data from the newly released files of the 2000 U.S.
Population Census on the "place of birth for the foreign-born population." Fortunately, these data are disaggregated by country of birth for about 50 specific countries.
However, it is not clear whether all of the "foreign-born" population are, in fact migrants.
For example, a person born in Mexico and brought to the United States as an infant would probably not consider himself as a migrant. Moreover, it is also not clear how many of those who enter the United States illegally are, in fact, included in the "foreignborn" population figures. As some observers have suggested, the U.S. Census data may be grossly undercounting the actual migrant population that is living -legally or illegally 9 While the Carrington and Detragiache (1998) study is based upon data from the 1990 U.S. Population Census, this study uses newly released data from the 2000 U.S. Census.
-in the United States. 10 Since illegal migrants are likely to be less educated than legal migrants, this may in turn lead to an overestimate of the average level of migrant education. This source of bias, however, should not seriously distort our estimates of the migration rate of individuals with tertiary education, since those with higher levels of education are more likely to be in the United States on a legal basis.
The second step is to estimate from the 2000 U.S. Census data the number of "foreign born" from each country who are 25 years of age or older. This is necessary to maximize the comparability of the immigrant population from each country with the Barro and Lee (2000) data set, which measures the educational attainment of the population over the age of 25 in each country.
The third step is to calculate for each population from each labor-exporting country the number of migrants in three specific educational categories: primary or less The final step is to use the Barro and Lee educational attainment data set to compute migration rates for each labor-exporting country for the same three educational categories mentioned above. These calculations enable us to show what fraction of each country's educational group has migrated to the United States.
Since this study relies heavily upon the educational attainment data contained in Barro and Lee (2000) , it is useful to describe this data set in some detail. Barro Table 4 presents immigration data to the United States for all 24 study countries.
It is striking to note that one single country -Mexico -dominates migration to the United
States. In our sample about 50 percent of all immigrants in the United States come from Mexico! 12 The second largest source of immigrants is the China, PR, which supplies less than 10 percent of total migrants. China, PR, which is the third-largest source of immigrants to the United States (see Table   13 According to In other words, the estimated figure for tertiary-educated migrants from Jamaica must somehow overstate the true size of the brain drain from that country.
The second theme in Table 5 is that low-skilled migration to the United States is not very important for most labor-exporting countries. There are only two countries (ElSalvador and Mexico) for which the migration rate for those with a primary school or less education is greater than 10 percent. The highest figure for primary school migrants is that of El Salvador (12.4 percent), followed by Mexico (10.8 percent). While the migration data in Table 5 Table 6 presents data for 13 of the 24 study countries for which immigration data to the OECD exist. As in the case of immigration to the United States, one country dominates: Turkey. In our sample about 40 percent of all immigrants to the OECD come from Turkey. The second largest source of immigrants in our sample is China, PR, which supplies about 15 percent of total migrants. Two North African countries --Morocco and Tunisia --combine together to produce about 15 percent of all migrants to the OECD. However, it is important to emphasize that these estimates of the number of educated migrants probably overestimate the true extent of the brain drain to the OECD for two reasons. First, levels of educational attainment for migrants to the OECD must be estimated, rather than observed as in the United States, because the OECD does not collect data on the educational characteristics of immigrants. For example, since the educational distribution of Turkish migrants to the OECD must be estimated on the basis of U.S. data, and the educational distribution of these OECD migrants might be quite different from that of their United States-bound compatriots, the figures in Table 7 might over-estimate the extent of the brain drain. Second, as in the United States, published data on the number of immigrants to the OECD exclude the large (and unknown) number of illegal immigrants to these countries, who are likely to have lower levels of education.
For instance, it is likely that a large number of illegal immigrants from North Africa to the OECD have low levels of education, simply because rates of educational attainment in these North African countries are low.
15 Table 7 presents migration rates by educational category for each labor-exporting country. Focusing on the tertiary level of education, the available data suggest that migration to the OECD causes more of a brain drain than it does in the United States.
For 5 of the 13 countries for which data exist, more than 10 percent of those with a tertiary education have migrated to the OECD. For these five countries, the rates of migration for those with a tertiary education range from 16.5 percent (Sri Lanka) to 95.8 percent (Jamaica). The latter country -Jamaica -must be suffering from a particularly high degree of brain drain, because it has the highest migration rate for tertiary-educated people to both the OECD and the United States (see Table 5 ).
The data in Table 7 suggest that migration to the OECD differs from that to the United States in another important way. While migration to the United States tends to take a high percentage of tertiary-educated people from neighboring (Latin American) countries, in the OECD the link between migration, education and geography is not so obvious. While three of the countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) with the highest rates for tertiary-educated migration are located close to the OECD, two other prominent countries (Jamaica and Sri Lanka) are not. More work needs to be done to identify the reasons why Jamaica and Sri Lanka send such a high proportion of their "best and brightest" to the OECD.
The final point to be noted in Table 7 is that total migration rates to the OECD are lower than those to the United States. While four labor-exporting countries have total migration rates in excess of 10 percent to the United States, no country in the OECD has a total migration rate above that mark. Jamaica has the highest overall migration rate to the OECD, at 8.7 percent. Again, the combination of small population and a high degree of migration abroad lead Jamaica to record a higher migration rate than such large, laborexporting countries, like Turkey and the Philippines.
VI. Conclusion
While the level of international migration and remittances continues to grow between countries, data on the whole process of international migration remains fragmented, scattered and unreliable. At the international level, there is no consistent set of statistics on either the number or skill characteristics of international migrants. At the national level, labor-exporting countries do not typically keep track either of the number or the skill characteristics of migrants. And while some labor-receiving countries do keep track these issues, they often miss the large numbers of migrants who enter their borders on an illegal basis.
Using a new data set of 24 large, labor-exporting countries, and employing estimates of migration and educational attainment based on United States and OECD records, this paper has tried to overcome these data problems to answer such policy questions as: How pervasive is the brain drain from labor-exporting countries? Which countries or regions of the developing world are most affected? Does international migration deprive labor-exporting countries of a sizeable fraction of their "best and brightest," or are their numbers too small to worry about?
Five conclusions to these, and similar questions, emerge from this paper. While these conclusions are often based on estimates of migration which are rough and in need of further refinement, they are still suggestive.
The first finding is that the level of international migration continues to grow annually. While no accurate, time-series data exist on changes in the total level of international migration, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) does keep annual records on the level of official remittances sent home by migrant workers. Over the last twenty years, these records show that the official worker remittances have increased at a steady 3.86 percent per year for the 24 study countries. 16 This annual rate of increase for official worker remittances is higher than that recorded for the annual rate of GDP growth (1.61 percent per year) in 119 low and lower middle-income developing countries over the last twenty years.
The second finding from this study is that with respect to legal migration, international migration definitely involves the movement of the educated. In both the United States and the OECD, individuals with a primary education account for less than 30 percent of total immigrants. The vast majority of immigrants to both regions (67 percent in the United States and 88 percent in the OECD) have a secondary (high school) education or higher. 17 From an educational standpoint, international migrants represent an elite that is much better educated than the rest of the population in their country of origin.
The third finding is that while migrants are well-educated, international migration does not tend to take a very high proportion of the best educated (tertiary) population in labor-exporting countries. For 22 of the 33 countries in which educational attainment data can be estimated, 18 less than 10 percent of the tertiary-educated population of laborexporting countries has migrated to the United States or the OECD. Part of the reason for this finding is that large labor-exporting countries are also typically large population countries, which have a substantial number of tertiary-educated people. For example, one of the largest labor-exporters in this study -China, PR -has such a large pool of tertiary-educated people that international migration has a relatively small proportional impact on the domestic labor-market for the "best and brightest". Notes: No educational attainment data available on: Albania, Armenia, Morocco and Nigeria. Immigrants defined as foreign born population in the United States, age 25 years or over. Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary to 9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling.
Source: Author's calculations using data from special tabulation from U.S. Census Bureau based on 2000 U.S. Population Census, and the Barro-Lee data set (2000) on educational attainment. . Notes: No data available on number of immigrants from: Albania, Armenia, Colombia, Croatia, Dom. Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru and Sudan. Immigrants defined as immigrant or foreign born population by individual countries in the OECD, age 25 years or over. Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary to 9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling. For a list of OECD countries, see footnote (4). Notes: Immigrants defined as immigrant or foreign born population by individual countries in the OECD, age 25 years or over. Primary education or less corresponds to 0-8 years of schooling ; secondary to 9-12 years of schooling, and tertiary to more than 12 years of schooling. For a list of OECD countries, see footnote (4).
Source: Author's calculations from OECD, Trends in International Migration: Annual Report (2001), and the Barro-Lee data set (2000) on educational attainment.
